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21 de Noviembre 2007

"Los seres humanos están contribuyendo a hacer la tierra inhabitable, pero ése es un problema que no podrá resolverse mientras no nos ofrezcan un principio de gobierno a escala mundial"

(Norman Birnbaum, en El País)

Menudo artículo nos ha atizado aquí el amigo Norman. Vaya montón de chorradas que publican en este periódico.

Es lo que nos faltaba a los seres humanos, tener un gobierno planetario. El colmo. ¿Os imaginais la enorme cantidad de burócratas que emplearían? Sería como la ONU, pero con poder para imponer. Tremendo. No consigo imaginar un futuro más dantesco para la humanidad.

Ayer por ejemplo se publicó que los científicos de la ONU han exagerado el número de víctimas del SIDA nada menos que en 6 millones de personas. Esto no significa que el SIDA no sea un problema terrible, que lo es, pero deja clara la capacidad de los burócratas de la ONU. Sí, esos que nos aseguran que el cambio climático es un gran problema.

Y no falta el relativismo moral: "El confucianismo en China, el budismo en Japón, el hinduismo en India, el islam y el judaísmo tienen sus propios fundamentalismos". ¿Ah, sí? Pues yo no veo muchos chinos o tailandeses poniendo bombas. Lo que sea con tal de no denunciar al islamismo. Este pájaro sigue la estela de Zapatero, que siempre hablaba del terrorismo "internacional". Vaya par.

Publicado por Addison el 21 de Noviembre 2007 a las 11:45 AM

Comentarios

Bueno, el calentamiento se mide igual.
Exactamente en los últimos seis años a sido CERO.
O ZERO.
http://antonuriarte.blogspot.com/
Aquí puede verse la gráfica.

Aún así el secretario de estado de medio ambiente decía el otro día que nueve de los diez años mas calidos del ultimo siglo eran los mas recientes. MERECEMOS UN GOBIERNO QUE NO MIENTA.

Publicado por: calentamientocero el 21 de Noviembre 2007 a las 01:35 PM

Tú no tienes altura científica, ni capacidad de análisis (lo demuestras casi cada día) para saber si esas afirmaciones publicadas en El País son chorradas o no lo son.

El Congreso más reciente de científicos medioambientales ha corroborado el calentamiento global y ha corroborado su causa: las actividades industriales humanas y el uso de combustibles fósiles. Han aportado argumentos casi imposibles de desmontar.

Mientras haya países insolidarios, o que "compren" sus tasas de contaminación, será necesaria una autoridad mundial con capacidad coercitiva que limite a esos insolidarios.

Lo que pasa es que tú estás por eso de "hoy a disfrutar y mañana como si viene el diluvio". Tú sostienes que tu libertad es sagrada, y en esa libertad metes la libertad de envenenar y putear a otros, siempre que sean más débiles, ya que si son más fuertes ya se encargarán ellos de frenar "por cojones" tu libertad destructiva.

La libertad, si tiene que ser para todos, implica limitaciones también para todos. Y ahí es donde te duele. Porque tú no es que seas "liberal". Eres insolidario y ególatra. O sea, YO, YO, YO, MI, MI, MI, y a los demás que les vayan dando, o que se busquen la vida, o que se mueran de asco.

Es mejor que lo digas así de claro. La libertad infinita no existe, salvo si algunos tienen esclavitud infinita. Pero tú a esto dices, sí, sí, los que les toque de esclavos, que se jodan.

Lo malo es que te puede tocar a tí.

Publicado por: marlene el 21 de Noviembre 2007 a las 03:16 PM

"Han aportado argumentos casi imposibles de desmontar"

¿Tienes tu capacidad intelectual para decir esto? Te recuerdo que hay muchos científicos que no comporten las conclusiones de los informes de la ONU. Pero muchos. Esa pretendida unanimidad que te vende El País no existe.

"Será necesaria una autoridad mundial con capacidad coercitiva que limite a esos insolidarios"

Como no existe consenso, no está claro que exista el problema que mencionas. Por tanto, no sé que razonamiento puedo llevar a establecer una "autoridad mundial" que nos diga a todos como debemos vivir.

"La libertad, si tiene que ser para todos, implica limitaciones también para todos"

Nunca he dicho lo contrario. La diferencia entre tu y yo es que tu crees que el Estado tiene que intervenir en la vida de los ciudadanos hasta un grado X, y yo creo que esa intervención tiene que ser mucho menor.

"Pero tú a esto dices, sí, sí, los que les toque de esclavos, que se jodan"

No sé de que me hablas, francamente. Tienes un gran lío en la cabeza y desconoces totalmente en qué consiste el liberalismo. Puedo recomendarte a Mises, Hayek o Reissman, por ejemplo. O leer a Aynd Rand.

Publicado por: Addison el 21 de Noviembre 2007 a las 03:52 PM

- "El Congreso más reciente de científicos medioambientales ha corroborado el calentamiento global y ha corroborado su causa: las actividades industriales humanas y el uso de combustibles fósiles"

JUAS JUAS JUAS JUAS. Queridos progres, lo siento mucho, pero no habéis conseguido cerrar la boca a los científicos escépticos. Recomiendo el último libro de Jorge Alcalde, escuchar un debate a partes sobre el tema que hace días hicieron en la Cope (claro, para los no sensibles), ver alguno de los documentales que tienen otra opinión acerca del asunto (en Telemadrid pusieron uno de ellos hace unos días), etc... Por cierto, en el mismo programa de la cope los pro-catastrofistas mismos reconocían que la cosa de los combustibles fósiles no afecta vamos ni siquiera una pizca en el tema, lo que pasa es que hay intereses económicos y energéticos.

- "Tú no tienes altura científica". Claro, el cuento de siempre, que somos unos ignorantes y bla bla bla, y que nos cerremos la boca, deporte nacional entre los progres el de cerrar la boca a los demás, en fin, eso empieza a estar pasadito... como lo de fachas, hay que ver que poco originales que son nuestros progres.

- "La libertad infinita no existe, salvo si algunos tienen esclavitud infinita."

La libertad infinita no existe en ninguno de los casos, solo somos seres humanos. Si lo que se pretende decir es otra vez el cuento de que para que unos tengan libertad o riqueza tiene que ser a base de esclavizar a otros... me parece que alguien debe aplicarse a si mismo aquello de ser un ignorante que no conoce ni sabe lo que dice, y no hace falta ponerse a estudiar demasiado, solo hace falta mirar los hechos. A no ser, claro, que con lo de esclavitud nos estemos refiriendo al Gulag, o a China, o a la clase media española, esclavizada para poder mantener toda una cohorte de funcionarios "bien pagaos" y normalmente analfabetos e incompetentes, solo por poner un ejemplo.

- "será necesaria una autoridad mundial con capacidad coercitiva que limite a esos insolidarios"

Que divertidas las respuestas de esta sujeto, ¡jaja! En fin, lo de la autoridad mundial pro-solidaria, vamos, igualito igualito que lo que pretende el comunismo mas rancio, cosa que ya intentara en su tiempo el ilustre Stalin, ese angelito de la caridad, y cosa que se sigue intentando hoy día en pleno siglo XXI. O sea, que venga, ¡mas poder para que nos coaccionen!

Publicado por: progredeitor el 21 de Noviembre 2007 a las 04:03 PM

No me cansaré de recordar el caso de Timothy Ball, científico disidente de la secta del calentamiento global y que fue amenazado por los fanáticos que como mario sólo entienden la opinión como algo que ellos puedan tolerar.

Recordemos que esto no se da en el sentido contrario: es decir, los disidentes no amenazamos a los que defienden la idea del calentamiento global. Discutimos con los que estén dispuestos a discutir y pasamos de los fanáticos que vienen a hablar de argumentos científicos sin saber no ya lo que dicen sino además lo que creen haber leído.

Hay algo raro y es que mario no nos haya acusado de estar a sueldo de las petroleras. No tardará. Son previsibles.

"Lo que pasa es que tú estás por eso de "hoy a disfrutar y mañana como si viene el diluvio"."

No te das cuenta pero vas bien encaminado, mario. Los mitos del diluvio que abundan por doquier en el planeta se deben a una crecida de las aguas provocada por un cambio climático que a su vez fue causado por los hombres que habitaban la tierra hace unos 10.000 años, ya que no paraban de quemar madera y cañas para cocer cerámica o cocinar. Intolerable.

Publicado por: sYnth el 21 de Noviembre 2007 a las 04:10 PM

Me llama la atención que el pollo que escribió el artículo acabe hablando de islamismo radical cuando empezó hablando de calentamiento global, supongo que se está creando una nueva ideología en donde hay que meter en el mismo frasco todo eso, a saber:
*Calentamiento global
*Islam bueno, resto de religiones malas
*Pensar en beneficios de una empresa, malo-malísimo
*Repartir nuestros bienes, bueno.
*Criticar a un político de izquierdas, malo-malo
*Criticar a un político de derechas, bueno y a ser posible cerrarle el medio en donde habla.
*Democracias parlamentarias, malo-malísimo.
*Dictaduras de tres al cuarto, excelentes.
La lista es más larga, creo que ustedes ya se la saben.

Publicado por: epiro el 21 de Noviembre 2007 a las 05:07 PM

Bueno, hay muchas plantas que viven del CO2. Si dejáramos de producir dañaríamos, muy drásticamente, el ecosistema. Por lo tanto, contribuimos a la reforestación y al alimento del reino animal. Incluido los vegetarianos.

“””"Los seres humanos están contribuyendo a hacer la tierra inhabitable””””

Joder, pues acabo de escuchar al zapatos en el congreso, y según el, vivimos en el país de la maravillas. Cosa que me agradado tanto, que he salido a la escalera a dar un abrazo a la vecina.

Publicado por: atroma el 21 de Noviembre 2007 a las 05:19 PM

Steven McIntyre, responsable de climateaudit (http://www.climateaudit.org/), al estudiar las gráficas de temperaturas históricas que facilita la NASA, notó una extraña discontinuidad en muchas localizaciones de Estados Unidos (Véase-> http://www.dailytech.com/Blogger+Finds+Y2K+Bug+in+NASA+Climate+Data/article8383.htm), todas ellas datadas alrededor de enero de 2000. Se lo comunicó a los responsables de la NASA, que no le facilitaron el algoritmo para tratar de localizar el fallo (la NASA no publica el código fuente que usa para elaborar sus gráficos y que todo el mundo toma luego como base). Con ingeniería inversa, llegó a la conclusión de que el "salto"(http://images.dailytech.com/nimage/5625_large_Detroit_lakes_GISSplot.jpg) se debía al famoso bug Y2K (te cagas error de bulto por no corregir el efecto 2000 http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Efecto_2000) al manejar los datos brutos. McIntyre notificó el bug a la NASA, y le reconocieron (http://www.climateaudit.org/?p=1868) el error como un "descuido" que sería arreglado al actualizar de nuevo los datos. La NASA, en efecto, ha corregido los datos (http://data.giss.nasa.gov/gistemp/graphs/Fig.D.txt), eso sí, sin darle ninguna publicidad al asunto. Los resultados son pasmosos: 1998 ha dejado de ser el año más caluroso del siglo XX, algo repetido por el mainstream durante años. Ahora el año más caluroso del siglo XX, al menos en Estados Unidos, es 1934. De hecho, 5 (1934, 1921, 1931, 1938 y 1939) de los 10 años más calurosos en Estados Unidos resulta que ocurrieron antes de la segunda guerra mundial y solo 3 de los 10 corresponden a los últimos diez años (1998, 2006, 1999). Aquí explican todo de forma más detallada (http://www.badastronomy.com/bablog/2007/08/10/) y reproducen las dos tablas con el ranking de los años más calurosos, una con los datos antiguos y otra ya actualizados. ¿Se harán eco de estas correcciones los medios generalistas? ¿El bug solo ha afectado a los datos procesados en las estaciones de Estados Unidos o es "global"? (http://services.alphaworks.ibm.com/manyeyes/view/SIk76IsOtha6r4mhQs1ZI2-)

¿Y qué importancia tiene todo esto? Recordemos que la teoría del calentamiento global de origen antropogénico se basa en el hecho de que las temperaturas actuales no tienen parangón en el pasado y que esto se debe de forma directa al aumento de dióxido de carbono en la atmósfera a causa de la actividad humana. En ese sentido, de acuerdo con esa teoría, resulta chocante que en la década de 1930 (cuando la acumulación de CO2 era inferior) hubiese varios años seguidos con temperaturas iguales e incluso superiores (en 1934) a las actuales. Un breve periodo de "calentamiento global" cuya tendencia cambió en 1940 (entre 1940 y1970 la media de las temperaturas descendieron, por ello algunos pronosticaron hacia 1970 que íbamos hacia una nueva glaciación y los primeros movimientos ecologistas hablaban entonces de "enfriamiento global"). Las consecuencias, según comenta el meteorólogo Anthony Watts, son drásticas: al menos en Estados Unidos, habrían sido procesados incorrectamente los datos que han dado lugar a muchas teorías que sustentan algunas de las supuestas anomalías climáticas de los últimos años (temperaturas que supuestamente nunca antes se habrían producido desde que se registran los datos), y que han servido de base al alarmismo climático, por ejemplo con la gráfica del palo de hockey (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hockey_Stick_graph) que fue utilizado como evidencia de la teoría del calentamiento global por el IPCC en su informe de 2001 y el propio Al Gore ha seguido usando en su famoso documental.

No se acaba ahí el asunto: un grupo de voluntarios (http://www.surfacestations.org/) se ha dedicado a revisar la red de estaciones que se emplean para hacer las mediciones de temperatura, descubriendo graves problemas (1) (http://www.dailytech.com/New+Scandal+Erupts+over+NOAA+Climate+Data/article8347.htm) respecto a la fiabilidad de las estaciones que registran las temperaturas, que son una de las bases empíricas que sustentan la teoría del calentamiento global.

1.La teoría de calentamiento global comenzó a explicar que un juego simple de factsm - emerge las estaciones de supervisión de temperatura han mostrado una aproximadamente una subida de 1 grado durante el siglo pasado. ¿Pero justo de dónde vienen estas lecturas de temperaturas? La Mayoría son relatados por estaciones de voluntarios, por lo general no más que un termómetro dentro de una pequeña choza de madera o debajo de tejado conlgando. En EEOU, existen 1.221 estaciones de este tipo, todo administrado por el Centro de Datos Nacional Climático, una rama(sucursal) del NOAA.
Hace dos meses, hice un informe sobre un esfuerzo para validar esta red. Un grupo de voluntarios encabezado por el meteorólogo Antonio Watts había encontrado problemas serios. No sólo incumplen las exigencias del NCDC, Muchos puestos de medición usurpan posiciones(ubicaciones) inadecuadas de forma ridícula - sobre el asfalto caliente, al lado de barriles para quemar la basura, al lado de rajas(ventilaciones) de gases de combustión de calor, aún conectadas a chimeneas calientes y encima de parrillas exteriores (de salida de aire caliente producto de los aires acondicionados).

http://especiales.barrapunto.com/article.pl?sid=07/08/10/1814221

P.D.: La Ciencia debe adscribirse al Método científico basado en mediciones Empíricas y no en cuestiones Dogmáticas o de Intereses Políticos. Dejemos trabajar a la Ciencia.

Publicado por: jesus el 21 de Noviembre 2007 a las 06:00 PM

no siendo diestro ni en este ni en otros temas, yo pobre escisión de humano me pregunto como puede ser que la quema de combustible fosil a escala mundial no tenga llamemosle "efectos secundarios" de "ningún tipo" y según creo haber leido por ahí arriba hasta beneficiosos en caso de haberlos. "si hay seres que comen CO2 pues más comida para ellos y por extensión para los demás. mas o menos.
Pues perdón pero hay que ser MAAARCIAAAAAAAAAALLL, como este de la tele.y ya puestos y lanzaos, ¿a alguien se le ha ocurrido pensar cuantos tubos de escape, cuantas chimeneas hay repartidas por este mundo de dios?, ¿y casos de alergias, y cuantas variadas enfermedades con origen en algún tipo de contaminación medioambiental? estas tambien muy variadas, y ya por último que me voy, como carajo florecen algunas flores fuera de tiempo, meses antes incluso y por qué hay pajaros que no emigran llegada la fecha, si aquí la vivienda es insufrible

Publicado por: JHW el 21 de Noviembre 2007 a las 07:50 PM

Ya comienzan a salir a la superficie errores de bulto. Cuando la gente se preocupa por saber y pregunta, ¡Ajjjj¡, entonces quiebra la ideología.
La desmitificación del problema es en realidad muy sencilla. Hay que preguntar cosas generales, metodológicas y poner en cuestión con dudas metódicas todos los datos.
¿ Calentamiento global? ¿Como se mide, que método se utiliza y donde y en que condiciones?. ¿Desde cuando se mide y que metodo se utilizaba hace 50 y 100 años?. ¿Se comparan medias de temperatura obtenidas con el mismo método de registro?
Realmente sólo con los datos que se tienen se rompe toda el negociete montado. Ya lo muestra Jesús en el post anterior.

Publicado por: pisto el 21 de Noviembre 2007 a las 08:07 PM

Obviamente, JHW, no nos quedaremos sin CO2, es una ironía. si dejáramos de emitir los humanos, cosa difícil, otros ocuparían nuestro lugar, por ejemplo los arboles, que los tenemos muy elevados de moral, otro mito que no soporta rigor científico. Expulsan mas dióxido que oxigeno producen. O al menos, eso sostiene algunos científicos.

Lo que seria una lastima es que nos quedáramos sin gambas por querer controlar el dióxido de carbono, o posiblemente, quieran ponerlas prohibitivas para que el pobre no las cate.

El ser humano emite unas 2,5 gigatoneladas al año, lo que el 20% se recicla en los océanos, pero no porque sea su potencial, sino por que esa es la porción de pastel dióxido que les toca. No hay menú para más. Producir oxigeno es el proceso de convertir materia inorgánica en orgánica, es decir, CO2 Y H20 en O2. Por lo tanto, el baremo del proceso no es mayor que en otras épocas.

Por otro lado, yo no estaría tan seguro de que el petróleo es un compuesto formado por restos fósiles, esa idea se basa en una teoría, aceptada por muchos, la mayoría, pero no por todos.

Publicado por: atroma el 21 de Noviembre 2007 a las 09:09 PM

Yo a estos progres los ponía con una azada en mitad del Senegal a criar cebada. Sin tractores de gasóleo. Y luego que me cuenten los muy hijos de la Gran .....

Publicado por: Carlos J. el 22 de Noviembre 2007 a las 01:15 AM

Yo a estos progres los ponía con una azada en mitad del Senegal a criar cebada. Sin tractores de gasóleo. Y luego que me cuenten los muy hijos de la Gran .....

En cuanto rascas un poquito, les sale la pluma facha... :)

Publicado por: pepe el 22 de Noviembre 2007 a las 06:02 AM

En cuanto rascas un poquito, les sale la pluma facha... :)

Publicado por: pepe el Noviembre 22, 2007 6:02 AM

Tienes razón Pepito, y en cuanto rascas un poquito en el PSOE y vez a Bermejo hacerse fiscal de Franco y dependiendo de otro franquista como Cebrián para hacerse la propaganda política te das cuenta de cuanto fascista autoritario hay en nuestra izquierda, así que supongo que estarás encantado con los skin-heads que se manifiestan ultimamente en Madrid.

Publicado por: epiro el 22 de Noviembre 2007 a las 10:03 AM

Tienes razón Pepito, y en cuanto rascas un poquito en el PSOE y vez a Bermejo hacerse fiscal de Franco y dependiendo de otro franquista como Cebrián para hacerse la propaganda política te das cuenta de cuanto fascista autoritario hay en nuestra izquierda, así que supongo que estarás encantado con los skin-heads que se manifiestan ultimamente en Madrid.

Hay que ver como os gusta recordar al dictador cuyos ministros fundaron el partido que hoy defiendes.

Lecciones de fascismos, cuando estás defendiendo a un personaje que amenaza con mandarnos a Senegal y recuerda despectivamente a nuestros progenitores, ninguna. Dedícate a la viga de tu ojo, que harás mejor.

Publicado por: pepe el 22 de Noviembre 2007 a las 10:41 AM

Summary for Policymakers of the Synthesis Report of the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report
DRAFT COPY 16 NOVEMBER 2007 23:04 – Subject to final copyedit
Page 1 of 23
Introduction
This Synthesis Report is based on the assessment carried out by the three Working Groups of the IPCC. It provides
an integrated view of climate change as the final part of the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report.
A complete elaboration of the topics covered in this summary can be found in this Synthesis Report and in the
underlying reports of the three Working Groups.
1. Observed changes in climate and their effects
Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of increases in global
average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice, and rising global average sea level
(Figure SPM.1). {1.1}
Eleven of the last twelve years (1995-2006) rank among the twelve warmest years in the instrumental record of
global surface temperature (since 1850). The 100-year linear trend (1906-2005) of 0.74 [0.56 to 0.92]°C 1 is larger
than the corresponding trend of 0.6 [0.4 to 0.8]◦C (1901-2000) given in the Third Assessment Report (TAR)
(Figure SPM.1). The temperature increase is widespread over the globe, and is greater at higher northern latitudes.
Land regions have warmed faster than the oceans (Figures SPM.2, SPM.4). {1.1, 1.2}
Rising sea level is consistent with warming (Figure SPM.1). Global average sea level has risen since 1961 at an
average rate of 1.8 [1.3 to 2.3]mm/yr and since 1993 at 3.1 [2.4 to 3.8]mm/yr, with contributions from thermal
expansion, melting glaciers and ice caps, and the polar ice sheets. Whether the faster rate for 1993 to 2003 reflects
decadal variation or an increase in the longer-term trend is unclear. {1.1}
Observed decreases in snow and ice extent are also consistent with warming (Figure SPM.1). Satellite data since
1978 show that annual average Arctic sea ice extent has shrunk by 2.7 [2.1 to 3.3]% per decade, with larger
decreases in summer of 7.4 [5.0 to 9.8]% per decade. Mountain glaciers and snow cover on average have declined
in both hemispheres. {1.1}
From 1900 to 2005, precipitation increased significantly in eastern parts of North and South America, northern
Europe and northern and central Asia but declined in the Sahel, the Mediterranean, southern Africa and parts of
southern Asia. Globally, the area affected by drought has likely2 increased since the 1970s. {1.1}
It is very likely that over the past 50 years: cold days, cold nights and frosts have become less frequent over most
land areas, and hot days and hot nights have become more frequent. It is likely that: heat waves have become more
frequent over most land areas, the frequency of heavy precipitation events has increased over most areas, and since
1975 the incidence of extreme high sea level3 has increased worldwide. {1.1}
There is observational evidence of an increase in intense tropical cyclone activity in the North Atlantic since about
1970, with limited evidence of increases elsewhere. There is no clear trend in the annual numbers of tropical
cyclones. It is difficult to ascertain longer term trends in cyclone activity, particularly prior to 1970.
Average Northern Hemisphere temperatures during the second half of the 20th century were very likely higher than
during any other 50-year period in the last 500 years and likely the highest in at least the past 1300 years. {1.1}
1 Numbers in square brackets indicate a 90% uncertainty interval around a best estimate, i.e., there is an estimated 5% likelihood that the value
could be above the range given in square brackets and 5% likelihood that the value could be below that range. Uncertainty intervals are not
necessarily symmetric around the corresponding best estimate.
2 Words in italics represent calibrated expressions of uncertainty and confidence. Relevant terms are explained in the Box ‘Treatment of
uncertainty’ in the Introduction of this Synthesis Report.
3 Excluding tsunamis, which are not due to climate change. Extreme high sea level depends on average sea level and on regional weather
systems. It is defined here as the highest 1% of hourly values of observed sea level at a station for a given reference period.
Summary for Policymakers of the Synthesis Report of the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report
DRAFT COPY 16 NOVEMBER 2007 23:04 – Subject to final copyedit
Page 2 of 23
Changes in temperature, sea level and Northern Hemisphere snow cover
Figure SPM.1. Observed changes in (a) global average surface temperature; (b) global average sea level from tide gauge
(blue) and satellite (red) data and (c) Northern Hemisphere snow cover for March-April. All differences are relative to
corresponding averages for the period 1961-1990. Smoothed curves represent decadal averaged values while circles show
yearly values. The shaded areas are the uncertainty intervals estimated from a comprehensive analysis of known uncertainties
(a and b) and from the time series (c). {Figure 1.1}
Observational evidence4 from all continents and most oceans shows that many natural systems are being
affected by regional climate changes, particularly temperature increases. {1.2}
Changes in snow, ice and frozen ground have with high confidence increased the number and size of glacial lakes,
increased ground instability in mountain and other permafrost regions, and led to changes in some Arctic and
Antarctic ecosystems. {1.2}
There is high confidence that some hydrological systems have also been affected through increased runoff and
earlier spring peak discharge in many glacier- and snow-fed rivers, and effects on thermal structure and water
quality of warming rivers and lakes. {1.2}
In terrestrial ecosystems, earlier timing of spring events and poleward and upward shifts in plant and animal ranges
are with very high confidence linked to recent warming. In some marine and freshwater systems, shifts in ranges
and changes in algal, plankton and fish abundance are with high confidence associated with rising water
temperatures, as well as related changes in ice cover, salinity, oxygen levels and circulation. {1.2}
4 Based largely on data sets that cover the period since 1970.
Summary for Policymakers of the Synthesis Report of the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report
DRAFT COPY 16 NOVEMBER 2007 23:04 – Subject to final copyedit
Page 3 of 23
Of the more than 29,000 observational data series, from 75 studies, that show significant change in many physical
and biological systems, more than 89% are consistent with the direction of change expected as a response to
warming (Figure SPM.2). However, there is a notable lack of geographic balance in data and literature on observed
changes, with marked scarcity in developing countries. {1.3}
Changes in physical and biological systems and surface temperature 1970-2004
Figure SPM.2. Locations of significant changes in data series of physical systems (snow, ice and frozen ground; hydrology; and
coastal processes) and biological systems (terrestrial, marine, and freshwater biological systems), are shown together with
surface air temperature changes over the period 1970-2004. A subset of about 29,000 data series was selected from about
80,000 data series from 577 studies. These met the following criteria: (1) ending in 1990 or later; (2) spanning a period of at
least 20 years; and (3) showing a significant change in either direction, as assessed in individual studies. These data series are
from about 75 studies (of which about 70 are new since the Third Assessment) and contain about 29,000 data series, of which
about 28,000 are from European studies. White areas do not contain sufficient observational climate data to estimate a
temperature trend. The 2 x 2 boxes show the total number of data series with significant changes (top row) and the percentage
of those consistent with warming (bottom row) for (i) continental regions: North America (NAM), Latin America (LA), Europe
(EUR), Africa (AFR), Asia (AS), Australia and New Zealand (ANZ), and Polar Regions (PR) and (ii) global-scale: Terrestrial
(TER), Marine and Freshwater (MFW), and Global (GLO). The numbers of studies from the seven regional boxes (NAM, EUR,
AFR, AS, ANZ, PR) do not add up to the global (GLO) totals because numbers from regions except Polar do not include the
numbers related to Marine and Freshwater (MFW) systems. Locations of large-area marine changes are not shown on the map.
{Figure 1.2}
There is medium confidence that other effects of regional climate change on natural and human
environments are emerging, although many are difficult to discern due to adaptation and non-climatic
drivers.
They include effects of temperature increases on {1.2}
• agricultural and forestry management at Northern Hemisphere higher latitudes, such as earlier spring
planting of crops, and alterations in disturbance regimes of forests due to fires and pests
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• some aspects of human health, such as heat-related mortality in Europe, changes in infectious disease
vectors in some areas, and allergenic pollen in Northern Hemisphere high and mid-latitudes
• some human activities in the Arctic (e.g. hunting and travel over snow and ice) and in lower-elevation
alpine areas (such as mountain sports).
2. Causes of change
Changes in atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHGs) and aerosols, land-cover and solar radiation
alter the energy balance of the climate system.
Global GHG emissions due to human activities have grown since pre-industrial times, with an increase of
70% between 1970 and 2004 (Figure SPM.3).5 {2.1}
Carbon dioxide (CO2) is the most important anthropogenic GHG. Its annual emissions grew by about 80% between
1970 and 2004. The long-term trend of declining CO2 emissions per unit of energy supplied reversed after 2000.
{2.1}
Global anthropogenic GHG emissions
Figure SPM.3. (a) Global annual emissions of anthropogenic GHGs from 1970 to 2004.5 (b) Share of different anthropogenic
GHGs in total emissions in 2004 in terms of CO2-eq. (c) Share of different sectors in total anthropogenic GHG emissions in
2004 in terms of CO2-eq. (Forestry includes deforestation). {Figure 2.1}
Global atmospheric concentrations of CO2, methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O) have increased
markedly as a result of human activities since 1750 and now far exceed pre-industrial values determined
from ice cores spanning many thousands of years. {2.2}
Atmospheric concentrations of CO2 (379ppm) and CH4 (1774 ppb) in 2005 exceed by far the natural range over the
last 650,000 years. Global increases in CO2 concentrations are due primarily to fossil fuel use, with land-use
change providing another significant but smaller contribution. It is very likely that the observed increase in CH4
concentration is predominantly due to agriculture and fossil fuel use. Methane growth rates have declined since the
early 1990s, consistent with total emission (sum of anthropogenic and natural sources) being nearly constant
during this period. The increase in N2O concentration is primarily due to agriculture. {2.2}
There is very high confidence that the net effect of human activities since 1750 has been one of warming.6{2.2}
5 Includes only CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs and SF6 whose emissions are covered by the UNFCCC. These GHGs are weighted by their 100-
year Global Warming Potentials, using values consistent with reporting under the UNFCCC.
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Most of the observed increase in globally-averaged temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely due
to the observed increase in anthropogenic GHG concentrations.7 It is likely there has been significant
anthropogenic warming over the past 50 years averaged over each continent (except Antarctica) (Figure
SPM.4). {2.4}
During the past 50 years, the sum of solar and volcanic forcings would likely have produced cooling. Observed
patterns of warming and their changes are simulated only by models that include anthropogenic forcings.
Difficulties remain in simulating and attributing observed temperature changes at smaller than continental scales.
{2.4}
Global and continental temperature change
Figure SPM.4. Comparison of observed continental- and global-scale changes in surface temperature with results simulated by
climate models using either natural or both natural and anthropogenic forcings. Decadal averages of observations are shown for
the period 1906-2005 (black line) plotted against the centre of the decade and relative to the corresponding average for the
period 1901-1950. Lines are dashed where spatial coverage is less than 50%. Blue shaded bands show the 5-95% range for 19
simulations from 5 climate models using only the natural forcings due to solar activity and volcanoes. Red shaded bands show
the 5-95% range for 58 simulations from 14 climate models using both natural and anthropogenic forcings. {Figure 2.5}
6 Increases in GHGs tend to warm the surface while the net effect of increases in aerosols tends to cool it. The net effect due to human activities
since the pre-industrial era is one of warming (+1.6 [+0.6 to +2.4]W/m2). In comparison, changes in solar irradiance are estimated to have
caused a small warming effect (+0.12 [+0.06 to +0.30]W/m2).
7 Consideration of remaining uncertainty is based on current methodologies.
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Advances since the TAR show that discernible human influences extend beyond average temperature to
other aspects of climate. {2.4}
Human influences have: {2.4}
• very likely contributed to sea level rise during the latter half of the 20th century
• likely contributed to changes in wind patterns, affecting extra-tropical storm tracks and temperature
patterns
• likely increased temperatures of extreme hot nights, cold nights and cold days
• more likely than not increased risk of heat waves, area affected by drought since the 1970s and frequency
of heavy precipitation events.
Anthropogenic warming over the last three decades has likely had a discernible influence at the global scale
on observed changes in many physical and biological systems. {2.4}
Spatial agreement between regions of significant warming across the globe and locations of significant observed
changes in many systems consistent with warming is very unlikely to be due solely to natural variability. Several
modelling studies have linked some specific responses in physical and biological systems to anthropogenic
warming. {2.4}
More complete attribution of observed natural system responses to anthropogenic warming is currently prevented
by the short time scales of many impact studies, greater natural climate variability at regional scales, contributions
of non-climate factors and limited spatial coverage of studies. {2.4}
3. Projected climate change and its impacts
There is high agreement and much evidence that with current climate change mitigation policies and related
sustainable development practices, global GHG emissions will continue to grow over the next few decades.
{3.1}
The IPCC Special Report on Emission Scenarios (SRES, 2000) projects an increase of global GHG emissions by
25-90% (CO2-eq) between 2000 and 2030 (Figure SPM.5), with fossil fuels maintaining their dominant position in
the global energy mix to 2030 and beyond. More recent scenarios without additional emissions mitigation are
comparable in range. 8, 9 {3.1}
Continued GHG emissions at or above current rates would cause further warming and induce many
changes in the global climate system during the 21st century that would very likely be larger than those
observed during the 20th century (Table SPM.1, Figure SPM.5). {3.2.1}
For the next two decades a warming of about 0.2°C per decade is projected for a range of SRES emissions
scenarios. Even if the concentrations of all greenhouse gases and aerosols had been kept constant at year 2000
levels, a further warming of about 0.1oC per decade would be expected. Afterwards, temperature projections
increasingly depend on specific emission scenarios. {3.2}
8 For an explanation of SRES emission scenarios, see Box ‘SRES scenarios’ of this Synthesis Report. These scenarios do not include
additional climate policy above current ones; more recent studies differ with respect to UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol inclusion.
9 Emission pathways of mitigation scenarios are discussed in Section 5.
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Scenarios for GHG emissions from 2000 to 2100 (in the absence of additional climate
policies) and projections of surface temperatures
Figure SPM-5. Left Panel: Global GHG emissions (in CO2-eq) in the absence of climate policies: six illustrative SRES marker
scenarios (coloured lines) and the 80th percentile range of recent scenarios published since SRES (post-SRES) (gray shaded
area). Dashed lines show the full range of post-SRES scenarios. The emissions cover CO2, CH4, N2O, and F-gases. Right
Panel: Solid lines are multi-model global averages of surface warming for scenarios A2, A1B and B1, shown as continuations of
the 20th century simulations. These projections also take into account emissions of short-lived GHGs and aerosols. The pink line
is not a scenario, but is for AOGCM simulations where atmospheric concentrations are held constant at year 2000 values. The
bars at the right of the figure indicate the best estimate (solid line within each bar) and the likely range assessed for the six
SRES marker scenarios at 2090-2099. All temperatures are relative to the period 1980-1999. {Figure 3.1, Figure 3.2}
Table SPM.1. Projected global averaged surface warming and sea level rise at the end of the 21st century. {Table 3.1}
Temperature change
(°C at 2090-2099 relative to 1980-1999) a, d
Sea level rise
(m at 2090-2099 relative to
1980-1999)
Case Best
estimate
Likely
range
Model-based range
excluding future rapid dynamical
changes in ice flow
Constant year 2000
concentrations b 0.6 0.3 – 0.9 Not available
B1 scenario 1.8 1.1 – 2.9 0.18 – 0.38
A1T scenario 2.4 1.4 – 3.8 0.20 – 0.45
B2 scenario 2.4 1.4 – 3.8 0.20 – 0.43
A1B scenario 2.8 1.7 – 4.4 0.21 – 0.48
A2 scenario 3.4 2.0 – 5.4 0.23 – 0.51
A1FI scenario 4.0 2.4 – 6.4 0.26 – 0.59
Notes:
a) Temperatures are assessed best estimates and likely uncertainty ranges from a hierarchy of models of varying complexity as well as
observational constraints.
b) Year 2000 constant composition is derived from Atmosphere-Ocean General Circulation Models (AOGCMs) only.
c) All scenarios above are six SRES marker scenarios. Approximate carbon dioxide equivalent concentrations corresponding to the computed
radiative forcing due to anthropogenic GHGs and aerosols in 2100 (see p. 823 of the TAR) for the SRES B1, AIT, B2, A1B, A2 and A1FI
illustrative marker scenarios are about 600, 700, 800, 850, 1250 and 1550 ppm, respectively.
d) Temperature changes are expressed as the difference from the period 1980-1999. To express the change relative to the period 1850-1899
add 0.5 oC.
The range of projections (Table SPM.1) is broadly consistent with the TAR, but uncertainties and upper ranges for
temperature are larger mainly because the broader range of available models suggests stronger climate-carbon
cycle feedbacks. Warming reduces terrestrial and ocean uptake of atmospheric CO2, increasing the fraction of
anthropogenic emissions remaining in the atmosphere. The strength of this feedback effect varies markedly among
models. {2.3, 3.2.1}
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Because understanding of some important effects driving sea level rise is too limited, this report does not assess the
likelihood, nor provide a best estimate or an upper bound for sea level rise. Table SPM.1 shows model-based
projections of global average sea level rise for 2090-2099.10 The projections do not include uncertainties in
climate-carbon cycle feedbacks nor the full effects of changes in ice sheet flow, therefore the upper values of the
ranges are not to be considered upper bounds for sea level rise. They include a contribution from increased
Greenland and Antarctic ice flow at the rates observed for 1993-2003, but this could increase or decrease in the
future.11 {3.2.1}
There is now higher confidence than in the TAR in projected patterns of warming and other regional-scale
features, including changes in wind patterns, precipitation, and some aspects of extremes and sea ice. {3.2.2}
Regional-scale changes include: {3.2.2}
• warming greatest over land and at most high northern latitudes and least over Southern Ocean and parts of
the North Atlantic Ocean, continuing recent observed trends (Figure SPM.6) in contraction of snow cover
area, increases in thaw depth over most permafrost regions, and decrease in sea ice extent; in some
projections using SRES scenarios, Arctic late-summer sea ice disappears almost entirely by the latter part
of the 21st century
• very likely increase in frequency of hot extremes, heat waves, and heavy precipitation
• likely increase in tropical cyclone intensity; less confidence in global decrease of tropical cyclone numbers
• poleward shift of extra-tropical storm tracks with consequent changes in wind, precipitation, and
temperature patterns
• very likely precipitation increases in high latitudes and likely decreases in most subtropical land regions,
continuing observed recent trends
There is high confidence that by mid-century, annual river runoff and water availability are projected to increase at
high latitudes (and in some tropical wet areas) and decrease in some dry regions in the mid-latitudes and tropics.
There is also high confidence that many semi-arid areas (e.g. Mediterranean basin, western United States, southern
Africa and northeast Brazil) will suffer a decrease in water resources due to climate change. {3.2; Figure 3.4}
Geographical pattern of surface warming
Figure SPM. 6. Projected surface temperature changes for the late 21st century (2090-2099). The map shows the multi-
AOGCM average projection for the A1B SRES scenario. All temperatures are relative to the period 1980-1999. {Figure 3.2}
10 TAR projections were made for 2100, whereas the projections for this report are for 2090-2099. The TAR would have had similar ranges to
those in Table SPM.1 if it had treated uncertainties in the same way.
11 For discussion of the longer term see material below.
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Studies since the TAR have enabled more systematic understanding of the timing and magnitude of impacts
related to differing amounts and rates of climate change. {3.3.1, 3.3.2}
Figure SPM.7 presents examples of this new information for systems and sectors. The top panel shows impacts
increasing with increasing temperature change. Their estimated magnitude and timing is also affected by
development pathway (lower panel). {3.3.1, 3.3.2}
Figure SPM.7. Examples of impacts associated with projected global average surface warming. Upper panel: Illustrative
examples of global impacts projected for climate changes (and sea level and atmospheric CO2 where relevant) associated with
different amounts of increase in global average surface temperature in the 21st century. The black lines link impacts; broken-line
arrows indicate impacts continuing with increasing temperature. Entries are placed so that the left hand side of text indicates the
approximate level of warming that is associated with the onset of a given impact. Quantitative entries for water scarcity and
flooding represent the additional impacts of climate change relative to the conditions projected across the range of SRES
scenarios A1FI, A2, B1 and B2. Adaptation to climate change is not included in these estimations. Confidence levels for all
statements are high. Lower panel: Dots and bars indicate the best estimate and likely ranges of warming assessed for the six
SRES marker scenarios for 2090-2099 relative to 1980-1999. {Figure 3.5}
Examples of some projected impacts for different regions are given in Table SPM.2.
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Table SPM.2. Examples of some projected regional impacts*
Africa
• By 2020, between 75 and 250 million of people are projected to be exposed to increased water stress due to climate
change;
• By 2020, in some countries, yields from rain-fed agriculture could be reduced by up to 50%. Agricultural production,
including access to food, in many African countries is projected to be severely compromised. This would further
adversely affect food security and exacerbate malnutrition;
• Towards the end of the 21st century, projected sea-level rise will affect low-lying coastal areas with large
populations. The cost of adaptation could amount to at least 5-10% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP);
• By 2080, an increase of 5-8% of arid and semi-arid land in Africa is projected under a range of climate scenarios
(TS).
Asia
• By the 2050s, freshwater availability in Central, South, East and South-EastAsia, particularly in large river basins, is
projected to decrease;
• Coastal areas, especially heavily-populated megadelta regions in South, East and South-East Asia, will be at
greatest risk due to increased flooding from the sea and, in some megadeltas, flooding from the rivers;
• Climate change is projected to compound the pressures on natural resources and the environment, associated with
rapid urbanization, industrialization and economic development;
• Endemic morbidity and mortality due to diarrhoeal disease primarily associated with floods and droughts are
expected to rise in East, South and South-East Asia due to projected changes in the hydrological cycle.
Australia and
New Zealand
• By 2020, significant loss of biodiversity is projected to occur in some ecologically rich sites including the Great
Barrier Reef and Queensland Wet Tropics;
• By 2030, water security problems are projected to intensify in southern and eastern Australia and, in New Zealand, in
Northland and some eastern regions;
• By 2030, production from agriculture and forestry is projected to decline over much of southern and eastern
Australia, and over parts of eastern New Zealand, due to increased drought and fire. However, in New Zealand,
initial benefits are projected in some other regions.;
• By 2050, ongoing coastal development and population growth in some areas of Australia and New Zealand are
projected to exacerbate risks from sea level rise and increases in the severity and frequency of storms and
coastal flooding.
Europe
• Climate change is expected to magnify regional differences in Europe’s natural resources and assets. Negative
impacts will include increased risk of inland flash floods, and more frequent coastal flooding and increased erosion
(due to storminess and sea-level rise);
• Mountainous areas will face glacier retreat, reduced snow cover and winter tourism, and extensive species losses (in
some areas up to 60% under high emissions scenarios by 2080);
• In Southern Europe, climate change is projected to worsen conditions (high temperatures and drought) in a region
already vulnerable to climate variability, and to reduce water availability, hydropower potential, summer tourism
and, in general, crop productivity;
• Climate change is also projected to increase the health risks due to heat-waves, and the frequency of wildfires.
Latin America
• By mid century, increases in temperature and associated decreases in soil water are projected to lead to gradual
replacement of tropical forest by savanna in eastern Amazonia. Semi-arid vegetation will tend to be replaced by
arid-land vegetation.
• There is a risk of significant biodiversity loss through species extinction in many areas of tropical Latin America;
• Productivity of some important crops is projected to decrease and livestock productivity to decline, with adverse
consequences for food security. In temperate zones soybean yields are projected to increase. Overall, the number
of people at risk of hunger is projected to increase (TS; medium confidence).
• Changes in precipitation patterns and the disappearance of glaciers are projected to significantly affect water
availability for human consumption, agriculture and energy generation.
North
America
• Warming in western mountains is projected to cause decreased snowpack, more winter flooding, and reduced
summer flows, exacerbating competition for over-allocated water resources;
• In the early decades of the century, moderate climate change is projected to increase aggregate yields of rain-fed
agriculture by 5-20%, but with important variability among regions. Major challenges are projected for crops that
are near the warm end of their suitable range or which depend on highly utilized water resources;
• During the course of this century, cities that currently experience heatwaves are expected to be further challenged by
an increased number, intensity and duration of heatwaves during the course of the century, with potential for
adverse health impacts;
• Coastal communities and habitats will be increasingly stressed by climate change impacts interacting with
development and pollution.
Polar
Regions
• The main projected biophysical effects are reductions in thickness and extent of glaciers and ice sheets and sea ice,
and changes in natural ecosystems with detrimental effects on many organisms including migratory birds,
mammals and higher predators;
• For human communities in the Arctic, impacts, particularly those resulting from changing snow and ice conditions are
projected to be mixed;
• Detrimental impacts would include those on infrastructure and traditional indigenous ways of life;
• In both polar regions, specific ecosystems and habitats are projected to be vulnerable, as climatic barriers to species
invasions are lowered.
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Table SPM.2. (cont.)
Small
Islands
• Sea-level rise is expected to exacerbate inundation, storm surge, erosion and other coastal hazards, thus
threatening vital infrastructure, settlements and facilities that support the livelihood of island communities;
• Deterioration in coastal conditions, for example through erosion of beaches and coral bleaching is expected to affect
local resources;
• By mid-century, climate change is expected to reduce water resources in many small islands, e.g., in the Caribbean
and Pacific, to the point where they become insufficient to meet demand during low-rainfall periods.
• With higher temperatures, increased invasion by non-native species is expected to occur, particularly on mid- and
high-latitude islands.
*Unless stated explicitly, all entries are from WGII SPM text, and are either very high confidence or high confidence statements, reflecting
different sectors (Agriculture, Ecosystems, Water, Coasts, Health, Industry and Settlements). The WGII SPM refers to the source of the
statements, timelines and temperatures. The magnitude and timing of impacts that will ultimately be realized will vary with the amount and
rate of climate change, emission scenarios, development pathways and adaptation.
Some systems, sectors and regions are likely to be especially affected by climate change.12
Systems and sectors: {3.3.4}
• particular ecosystems:
• terrestrial: tundra, boreal forest and mountain regions because of sensitivity to warming;
mediterranean-type ecosystems because of reduction in rainfall; and tropical rainforests where
precipitation declines
• coastal: mangroves and salt marshes, due to multiple stresses
• marine: coral reefs due to multiple stresses; the sea ice biome because of sensitivity to warming
• water resources in some dry regions at mid-latitudes13 and in the dry tropics, due to changes in rainfall and
evapotranspiration, and in areas dependent on snow and ice melt
• agriculture in low-latitudes , due to reduced water availability
• low-lying coastal systems, due to threat of sea level rise and increased risk from extreme weather events
• human health in populations with low adaptive capacity.
Regions: {3.3.4}
• the Arctic, because of the impacts of high rates of projected warming on natural systems and human
communities
• Africa, because of low adaptive capacity and projected climate change impacts
• small islands, where there is high exposure of population and infrastructure to projected climate change
impacts
• Asian and African megadeltas, due to large populations and high exposure to sea level rise, storm surges
and river flooding.
Within other areas, even those with high incomes, some people (such as the poor, young children, and the elderly)
can be particularly at risk, and also some areas and some activities. {3.3.4}
Ocean Acidification
The uptake of anthropogenic carbon since 1750 has led to the ocean becoming more acidic with an average
decrease in pH of 0.1 units. Increasing atmospheric CO2 concentrations lead to further acidification. Projections
based on SRES scenarios give a reduction in average global surface ocean pH of between 0.14 and 0.35 units over
the 21st century. While the effects of observed ocean acidification on the marine biosphere are as yet
undocumented, the progressive acidification of oceans is expected to have negative impacts on marine shellforming
organisms (e.g. corals) and their dependent species. {3.3.1}
12 Identified on the basis of expert judgement of the assessed literature and considering the magnitude, timing and projected rate of climate
change, sensitivity and adaptive capacity.
13 Including arid and semi-arid regions.
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Altered frequencies and intensities of extreme weather, together with sea level rise, are expected to have
mostly adverse effects on natural and human systems. {3.3.3}
Examples for selected extremes and sectors are shown in Table SPM.3. {Table 3.2}
Table SPM.3. Examples of possible impacts of climate change due to changes in extreme weather and climate events, based
on projections to the mid- to late 21st century. These do not take into account any changes or developments in adaptive
capacity. The likelihood estimates in column 2 relate to the phenomena listed in column 1. {WGII Table SPM.1}
Examples of major projected impacts by sector
Phenomenona and
direction of trend
Likelihood of
future trends
based on
projections for
21st century
using SRES
scenarios
Agriculture, forestry
and ecosystems {WGII
4.4, 5.4}
Water resources
{WGII 3.4}
Human health
{WGII 8.2, 8.4}
Industry, settlement
and society
{WGII 7.4}
Over most land
areas, warmer
and fewer cold
days and nights,
warmer and more
frequent hot days
and nights
Virtually
certainb
Increased yields in
colder environments;
decreased yields in
warmer environments;
increased insect
outbreaks
Effects on water
resources relying on
snowmelt; effects on
some water supplies
Reduced human
mortality from
decreased cold
exposure
Reduced energy
demand for heating;
increased demand for
cooling; declining air
quality in cities; reduced
disruption to transport
due to snow, ice; effects
on winter tourism
Warm spells/heat
waves. Frequency
increased over
most land areas
Very likely
Reduced yields in
warmer regions due to
heat stress; increased
danger of wildfire
Increased water
demand; water quality
problems, e.g. algal
blooms
Increased risk of heatrelated
mortality,
especially for the
elderly, chronically sick,
very young and socially
isolated
Reduction in quality of
life for people in warm
areas without
appropriate housing;
impacts on the elderly,
very young and poor
Heavy
precipitation
events. Frequency
increases over
most areas
Very likely
Damage to crops; soil
erosion, inability to
cultivate land due to
waterlogging of soils
Adverse effects on
quality of surface and
groundwater;
contamination of water
supply; water scarcity
may be relieved
Increased risk of
deaths, injuries and
infectious, respiratory
and skin diseases
Disruption of
settlements, commerce,
transport and societies
due to flooding:
pressures on urban and
rural infrastructures;
loss of property
Area affected by
drought increases Likely
Land degradation; lower
yields/crop damage and
failure; increased
livestock deaths;
increased risk of wildfire
More widespread water
stress
Increased risk of food
and water shortage;
increased risk of
malnutrition; increased
risk of water-and foodborne
diseases
Water shortage for
settlements, industry
and societies; reduced
hydropower generation
potentials; potential for
population migration
Intense tropical
cyclone activity
increases
Likely
Damage to crops;
windthrow (uprooting) of
trees; damage to coral
reefs
Power outages causing
disruption of public
water supply
Increased risk of
deaths, injuries, waterand
food- borne
diseases; posttraumatic
stress
disorders
Disruption by flood and
high winds; withdrawal
of risk coverage in
vulnerable areas by
private insurers,
potential for population
migrations, loss of
property
Increased
incidence of
extreme high sea
level (excludes
tsunamis)c
Likelyd
Salinisation of irrigation
water, estuaries and
freshwater systems
Decreased freshwater
availability due to
saltwater intrusion
Increased risk of deaths
and injuries by
drowning in floods;
migration-related health
effects
Costs of coastal
protection versus costs
of land-use relocation;
potential for movement
of populations and
infrastructure; also see
tropical cyclones above
Notes:
a) See WGI Table 3.7 for further details regarding definitions.
b) Warming of the most extreme days and nights each year.
c) Extreme high sea level depends on average sea level and on regional weather systems. It is defined as the highest 1% of hourly values of
observed sea level at a station for a given reference period.
d) In all scenarios, the projected global average sea level at 2100 is higher than in the reference period {WGI 10.6}. The effect of changes in
regional weather systems on sea level extremes has not been assessed.
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Anthropogenic warming and sea level rise would continue for centuries due to the timescales associated with
climate processes and feedbacks, even if GHG concentrations were to be stabilised. {3.2.3}
Estimated long term (multi-century) warming corresponding to the six AR4 WG III stabilisation categories is
shown in Figure SPM.8.
Estimated multi-century warming relative to 1980-1999 for AR4 stabilisation categories
Global average temperature change relative to 1980-1999
Figure SPM.8. Estimated long term (multi-century) warming corresponding to the six AR4 WGIII stabilisation categories (Table
SPM.3). Temperature scale has been shifted by -0.5°C compared to Table SPM.3 to account approximately for the warming
between pre-industrial and 1980-1999. For most stabilisation levels global average temperature is approaching the equilibrium
level over a few centuries. For GHG emission scenarios that lead to stabilisation by 2100 at levels comparable to SRES B1 and
A1B (600 and 850 CO2-eq. ppm; category IV and V) assessed models project that about 65-70% of the estimated global
equilibrium temperature increase assuming a climate sensitivity of 3oC would be realised at the time of stabilisation (WGI
10.7.2). For the much lower stabilisation scenarios (category I and II), the equilibrium temperature may be reached earlier
(Figure SPM.11).
Contraction of the Greenland ice sheet is projected to continue to contribute to sea level rise after 2100. Current
models suggest virtually complete elimination of the Greenland ice sheet and a resulting contribution to sea level
rise of about 7 m if global average warming were sustained for millennia in excess of 1.9 to 4.6ºC relative to preindustrial
values. The corresponding future temperatures in Greenland are comparable to those inferred for the last
interglacial period 125,000 years ago, when paleoclimatic information suggests reductions of polar land ice extent
and 4 to 6 m of sea level rise. {3.2.3}
Current global model studies project that the Antarctic ice sheet will remain too cold for widespread surface
melting and gain mass due to increased snowfall. However, net loss of ice mass could occur if dynamical ice
discharge dominates the ice sheet mass balance. {3.2.3}
Anthropogenic warming could lead to some impacts that are abrupt or irreversible, depending upon the rate
and magnitude of the climate change. {3.4}
Partial loss of ice sheets on polar land could imply metres of sea level rise, major changes in coastlines and
inundation of low-lying areas, with greatest effects in river deltas and low-lying islands. Such changes are
projected to occur over millennial time scales, but more rapid sea level rise on century time scales cannot be
excluded. {3.4}
Climate change is likely to lead to some irreversible impacts. There is medium confidence that approximately 20-
30% of species assessed so far are likely to be at increased risk of extinction if increases in global average warming
exceed 1.5-2.5oC (relative to 1980-1999). As global average temperature increase exceeds about 3.5oC, model
projections suggest significant extinctions (40-70% of species assessed) around the globe. {3.4}
Based on current model simulations, the meridional overturning circulation (MOC) of the Atlantic Ocean will very
likely slow down during the 21st century; nevertheless temperatures over the Atlantic and Europe are projected to
increase. The MOC is very unlikely to undergo a large abrupt transition during the 21stcentury. Longer-term MOC
changes cannot be assessed with confidence. Impacts of large-scale and persistent changes in the MOC are likely to
include changes in marine ecosystem productivity, fisheries, ocean CO2 uptake, oceanic oxygen concentrations and
terrestrial vegetation. Changes in terrestrial and ocean CO2 uptake may feed back on the climate system. {3.4}
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Page 14 of 23
4. Adaptation and mitigation options14
A wide array of adaptation options is available, but more extensive adaptation than is currently occurring is
required to reduce vulnerability to climate change. There are barriers, limits and costs, which are not fully
understood. {4.2}
Societies have a long record of managing the impacts of weather- and climate-related events. Nevertheless,
additional adaptation measures will be required to reduce the adverse impacts of projected climate change and
variability, regardless of the scale of mitigation undertaken over the next two to three decades. Moreover,
vulnerability to climate change can be exacerbated by other stresses. These arise from, for example, current climate
hazards, poverty and unequal access to resources, food insecurity, trends in economic globalisation, conflict and
incidence of diseases such as HIV/AIDS. {4.2}
Some planned adaptation to climate change is already occurring on a limited basis. Adaptation can reduce
vulnerability especially when it is embedded within broader sectoral initiatives (Table SPM.4). There is high
confidence that there are viable adaptation options that can be implemented in some sectors at low cost, and/or with
high benefit-cost ratios. However, comprehensive estimates of global costs and benefits of adaptation are limited.
{4.2, Table 4.1}
Adaptive capacity is intimately connected to social and economic development but is unevenly distributed
across and within societies. {4.2}
A range of barriers limit both the implementation and effectiveness of adaptation measures. The capacity to adapt
is dynamic and is influenced by a society’s productive base including: natural and man-made capital assets, social
networks and entitlements, human capital and institutions, governance, national income, health and technology.
Even societies with high adaptive capacity remain vulnerable to climate change, variability and extremes. {4.2}
Both bottom-up and top-down studies indicate that there is high agreement and much evidence of substantial
economic potential for the mitigation of global GHG emissions over the coming decades that could offset the
projected growth of global emissions or reduce emissions below current levels (Figure SPM.9, SPM.10)15.
While top-down and bottom-up studies are in line at the global level (Figure SPM.9) there are considerable
differences at the sectoral level. {4.3}
No single technology can provide all of the mitigation potential in any sector. The economic mitigation potential,
which is generally greater than the market mitigation potential, can only be achieved when adequate policies are in
place and barriers removed (Table SPM.5).
Bottom-up studies suggest that mitigation opportunities with net negative costs have the potential to reduce
emissions by around 6 GtCO2-eq/yr in 2030, realizing which requires dealing with implementation barriers. {4.3}
14 While this section deals with adaptation and mitigation separately, these responses can be complementary. This theme is discussed in
section 5.
15 The concept of “mitigation potential” has been developed to assess the scale of GHG reductions that could be made, relative to emission
baselines, for a given level of carbon price (expressed in cost per unit of carbon dioxide equivalent emissions avoided or reduced). Mitigation
potential is further differentiated in terms of “market mitigation potential” and “economic mitigation potential”.
Market mitigation potential is the mitigation potential based on private costs and private discount rates (reflecting the perspective of
private consumers and companies ), which might be expected to occur under forecast market conditions, including policies and measures
currently in place, noting that barriers limit actual uptake.
Economic mitigation potential is the mitigation potential, which takes into account social costs and benefits and social discount rates
(reflecting the perspective of society; social discount rates are lower than those used by private investors ), assuming that market efficiency
is improved by policies and measures and barriers are removed.
Mitigation potential is estimated using different types of approaches. Bottom-up studies are based on assessment of mitigation options,
emphasizing specific technologies and regulations. They are typically sectoral studies taking the macro-economy as unchanged. Top-down
studies assess the economy-wide potential of mitigation options. They use globally consistent frameworks and aggregated information
about mitigation options and capture macro-economic and market feedbacks.
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Page 15 of 23
Table SPM-4. Selected examples of planned adaptation by sector.
Sector
Adaptation option/strategy
Underlying policy
framework
Key constraints and opportunities
to implementation
(Normal font = constraints;
italics = opportunities)
Water
Expanded rainwater harvesting;
water storage and conservation
techniques; water re-use;
desalination; water-use and
irrigation efficiency
National water policies and
integrated water resources
management; water-related
hazards management
Financial, human resources and
physical barriers; integrated water
resources management; synergies
with other sectors
Agriculture
Adjustment of planting dates and
crop variety; crop relocation;
improved land management, e.g.
erosion control and soil protection
through tree planting
R&D policies; institutional
reform; land tenure and
land reform; training;
capacity building; crop
insurance; financial
incentives, e.g. subsidies
and tax credits
Technological & financial constraints;
access to new varieties; markets;
longer growing season in higher
latitudes; revenues from ‘new’
products
Infrastructure/settlement
(including coastal zones)
Relocation; seawalls and storm
surge barriers; dune reinforcement;
land acquisition and creation of
marshlands/wetlands as buffer
against sea level rise and flooding;
protection of existing natural
barriers
Standards and regulations
that integrate climate
change considerations into
design; land use policies;
building codes; insurance
Financial and technological barriers;
availability of relocation space;
integrated policies and
managements; synergies with
sustainable development goals
Human health
Heat-health action plans;
emergency medical services;
improved climate-sensitive disease
surveillance and control; safe water
and improved sanitation
Public health policies that
recognise climate risk;
strengthened health
services; regional and
international cooperation
Limits to human tolerance
(vulnerable groups); knowledge
limitations; financial capacity;
upgraded health services; improved
quality of life
Tourism
Diversification of tourism attractions
& revenues; shifting ski slopes to
higher altitudes and glaciers;
artificial snow-making
Integrated planning (e.g.
carrying capacity; linkages
with other sectors); financial
incentives, e.g. subsidies
and tax credits
Appeal/marketing of new attractions;
financial and logistical challenges;
potential adverse impact on other
sectors (e.g. artificial snow-making
may increase energy use); revenues
from ‘new’ attractions; involvement of
wider group of stakeholders
Transport
Realignment/relocation; design
standards and planning for roads,
rail, and other infrastructure to
cope with warming and drainage
Integrating climate change
considerations into national
transport policy; investment
in R&D for special
situations, e.g. permafrost
areas
Financial & technological barriers;
availability of less vulnerable routes;
improved technologies and
integration with key sectors (e.g.
energy)
Energy
Strengthening of overhead
transmission and distribution
infrastructure; underground cabling
for utilities; energy efficiency; use of
renewable sources; reduced
dependence on single sources of
energy
National energy policies,
regulations, and fiscal and
financial incentives to
encourage use of
alternative sources;
incorporating climate
change in design standards
Access to viable alternatives;
financial and technological barriers;
acceptance of new technologies;
stimulation of new technologies; use
of local resources
Note: Other examples from many sectors would include early warning systems.
Summary for Policymakers of the Synthesis Report of the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report
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Comparison between global economic mitigation potential and
projected emissions increase in 2030
Figure SPM.9. Global economic mitigation potential in 2030 estimated from bottom-up (Panel a) and top-down (Panel b)
studies, compared with the projected emission increases from SRES scenarios relative to 2000 GHG emissions of 40.8 GtCO2-
eq (Panel c). Note: GHG emissions in 2000 are exclusive of emissions of decay of above ground biomass that remains after
logging and deforestation and from peat fires and drained peat soils, to ensure consistency with the SRES emission results.
Economic mitigation potential by sector in 2030 estimated from bottom-up studies
Figure SPM.10. Estimated economic mitigation potential by sector in 2030 from bottom-up studies, compared to the respective
baselines assumed in the sector assessments. The potentials do not include non-technical options such as lifestyle changes.
{Figure 4.1}
Notes:
a) The ranges for global economic potentials as assessed in each sector are shown by vertical lines. The ranges are based on
end-use allocations of emissions, meaning that emissions of electricity use are counted towards the end-use sectors and not to
the energy supply sector.
b) The estimated potentials have been constrained by the availability of studies particularly at high carbon price levels.
c) Sectors used different baselines. For industry the SRES B2 baseline was taken, for energy supply and transport the WEO
2004 baseline was used; the building sector is based on a baseline in between SRES B2 and A1B; for waste, SRES A1B driving
forces were used to construct a waste specific baseline; agriculture and forestry used baselines that mostly used B2 driving
forces.
d) Only global totals for transport are shown because international aviation is included.
e) Categories excluded are: non-CO2 emissions in buildings and transport, part of material efficiency options, heat production
and cogeneration in energy supply, heavy duty vehicles, shipping and high-occupancy passenger transport, most high-cost
options for buildings, wastewater treatment, emission reduction from coal mines and gas pipelines, fluorinated gases from
energy supply and transport. The underestimation of the total economic potential from these emissions is of the order of 10-
15%.
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Table SPM-5. Selected examples of key sectoral mitigation technologies, policies and measures, constraints and opportunities.
{WGIII, Tables SPM.3, SPM.7}
Sector Key mitigation technologies and practices
currently commercially available. Key
mitigation technologies and practices
projected to be commercialised before 2030
shown in italics.
Policies, measures and
instruments shown to be
environmentally effective
Key constraints or
opportunities
(Normal font = constraints;
italics = opportunities)
Reduction of fossil fuel subsidies;
Taxes or carbon charges on fossil
fuels
Resistance by vested interests
may make them difficult to
implement
Energy
Supply
Improved supply and distribution efficiency; fuel
switching from coal to gas; nuclear power;
renewable heat and power (hydropower, solar,
wind, geothermal and bioenergy); combined heat
and power; early applications of Carbon Dioxide
Capture and Storage (CCS) (e.g. storage of
removed CO2 from natural gas); CCS for gas,
biomass and coal-fired electricity generating
facilities; advanced nuclear power; advanced
renewable energy, including tidal and wave
energy, concentrating solar, and solar
photovoltaics
Feed-in tariffs for renewable energy
technologies; Renewable energy
obligations; Producer subsidies
May be appropriate to create
markets for low emissions
technologies
Mandatory fuel economy, biofuel
blending and CO2 standards for
road transport
Partial coverage of vehicle fleet
may limit effectiveness
Taxes on vehicle purchase,
registration, use and motor fuels,
road and parking pricing
Effectiveness may drop with
higher incomes
Transport
More fuel efficient vehicles; hybrid vehicles;
cleaner diesel vehicles; biofuels; modal shifts from
road transport to rail and public transport systems;
non-motorised transport (cycling, walking); landuse
and transport planning*; Second generation
biofuels; higher efficiency aircraft; advanced
electric and hybrid vehicles with more powerful
and reliable batteries Influence mobility needs through
land use regulations, and
infrastructure planning; Investment
in attractive public transport facilities
and non-motorised forms of
transport
Particularly appropriate for
countries that are building up
their transportation systems
Appliance standards and labelling Periodic revision of standards
needed
Building codes and certification Attractive for new buildings.
Enforcement can be difficult
Demand-side management
programmes
Need for regulations so that
utilities may profit
Public sector leadership
programmes, including procurement
Government purchasing can
expand demand for energyefficient
products
Buildings
Efficient lighting and daylighting; more efficient
electrical appliances and heating and cooling
devices; improved cook stoves, improved
insulation; passive and active solar design for
heating and cooling; alternative refrigeration
fluids, recovery and recycling of fluorinated gases;
Integrated design of commercial buildings
including technologies, such as intelligent meters
that provide feedback and control; solar
photovoltaics integrated in buildings
Incentives for energy service
companies (ESCOs)
Success factor: Access to third
party financing
Provision of benchmark information;
Performance standards; Subsidies,
tax credits
May be appropriate to stimulate
technology uptake. Stability of
national policy important in view
of international competitiveness
Tradable permits Predictable allocation
mechanisms and stable price
signals important for investments
Industry
More efficient end-use electrical equipment; heat
and power recovery; material recycling and
substitution; control of non-CO2 gas emissions;
and a wide array of process-specific technologies;
Advanced energy efficiency; CCS for cement,
ammonia, and iron manufacture; inert electrodes
for aluminium manufacture
Voluntary agreements Success factors include: clear
targets, a baseline scenario, third
party involvement in design and
review and formal provisions of
monitoring, close cooperation
between government and
industry
Agriculture
Improved crop and grazing land management to
increase soil carbon storage; restoration of
cultivated peaty soils and degraded lands;
improved rice cultivation techniques and livestock
and manure management to reduce CH4
emissions; improved nitrogen fertiliser application
techniques to reduce N2O emissions; dedicated
energy crops to replace fossil fuel use; improved
energy efficiency; Improvements of crop yields
Financial incentives and regulations
for improved land management,
maintaining soil carbon content,
efficient use of fertilisers and
irrigation
May encourage synergy with
sustainable development and
with reducing vulnerability to
climate change, thereby
overcoming barriers to
implementation
Summary for Policymakers of the Synthesis Report of the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report
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Table SPM-5. (cont.)
Sector Key mitigation technologies and practices
currently commercially available. Key
mitigation technologies and practices
projected to be commercialised before 2030
shown in italics.
Policies, measures and
instruments shown to be
environmentally effective
Key constraints or
opportunities
(Normal font = constraints;
italics = opportunities)
Forestry/
forests
Afforestation; reforestation; forest management;
reduced deforestation; harvested wood product
management; use of forestry products for
bioenergy to replace fossil fuel use; Tree species
improvement to increase biomass productivity and
carbon sequestration. Improved remote sensing
technologies for analysis of vegetation/ soil
carbon sequestration potential and mapping land
use change
Financial incentives (national and
international) to increase forest
area, to reduce deforestation, and
to maintain and manage forests;
Land-use regulation and
enforcement
Constraints include lack of
investment capital and land
tenure issues. Can help poverty
alleviation.
Financial incentives for improved
waste and wastewater management
May stimulate technology
diffusion
Renewable energy incentives or
obligations
Local availability of low-cost fuel
Waste
Landfill CH4 recovery; waste incineration with
energy recovery; composting of organic waste;
controlled waste water treatment; recycling and
waste minimisation; biocovers and biofilters to
optimise CH4 oxidation
Waste management regulations Most effectively applied at
national level with enforcement
strategies
Future energy infrastructure investment decisions, expected to exceed 20 trillion US$16 between 2005 and 2030,
will have long-term impacts on GHG emissions, because of the long life-times of energy plants and other
infrastructure capital stock. The widespread diffusion of low-carbon technologies may take many decades, even if
early investments in these technologies are made attractive. Initial estimates show that returning global energyrelated
CO2 emissions to 2005 levels by 2030 would require a large shift in investment patterns, although the net
additional investment required ranges from negligible to 5-10%. {4.3}
A wide variety of policies and instruments are available to governments to create the incentives for
mitigation action. Their applicability depends on national circumstances and sectoral context (Table SPM5).
{4.3}
They include integrating climate policies in wider development policies, regulations and standards, taxes and
charges, tradable permits, financial incentives, voluntary agreements, information instruments, and research,
development and demonstration (RD&D). {4.3}
An effective carbon-price signal could realise significant mitigation potential in all sectors. Modelling studies show
global carbon prices rising to 20-80 US$/tCO2-eq by 2030 are consistent with stabilisation at around 550 ppm CO2-
eq by 2100. For the same stabilisation level, induced technological change may lower these price ranges to 5-65
US$/tCO2-eq in 2030.17 {4.3}
There is high agreement and much evidence that mitigation actions can result in near-term co-benefits (e.g.
improved health due to reduced air pollution) that may offset a substantial fraction of mitigation costs. {4.3}
There is high agreement and medium evidence that Annex I countries’ actions may affect the global economy and
global emissions, although the scale of carbon leakage remains uncertain.18 {4.3}
16 20 trillion = 20,000 billion = 20×1012
17 Studies on mitigation portfolios and macro-economic costs assessed in this report are based on top-down modelling. Most models use a
global least cost approach to mitigation portfolios, with universal emissions trading, assuming transparent markets, no transaction cost, and thus
perfect implementation of mitigation measures throughout the 21st century. Costs are given for a specific point in time. Global modelled costs
will increase if some regions, sectors (e.g. land-use), options or gases are excluded. Global modelled costs will decrease with lower baselines,
use of revenues from carbon taxes and auctioned permits, and if induced technological learning is included. These models do not consider
climate benefits and generally also co-benefits of mitigation measures, or equity issues. Significant progress has been achieved in applying
approaches based on induced technological change to stabilisation studies; however, conceptual issues remain. In the models that consider
induced technological change, projected costs for a given stabilisation level are reduced; the reductions are greater at lower stabilisation level.
18 Further details may be found in Topic 4 of the Synthesis Report.
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Page 19 of 23
Fossil fuel exporting nations (in both Annex I and non-Annex I countries) may expect, as indicated in the TAR,
lower demand and prices and lower GDP growth due to mitigation policies. The extent of this spill over depends
strongly on assumptions related to policy decisions and oil market conditions.
There is also high agreement and medium evidence that changes in lifestyle, behaviour patterns and management
practices can contribute to climate change mitigation across all sectors. {4.3}
Many options for reducing global GHG emissions through international cooperation exist. There is high
agreement and much evidence that notable achievements of the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol are the
establishment of a global response to climate change, stimulation of an array of national policies, and the
creation of an international carbon market and new institutional mechanisms that may provide the
foundation for future mitigation efforts. Progress has also been made in addressing adaptation within the
UNFCCC and additional international initiatives have been suggested. {4.5}
Greater cooperative efforts and expansion of market mechanisms will help to reduce global costs for achieving a
given level of mitigation, or will improve environmental effectiveness. Efforts can include diverse elements such as
emissions targets; sectoral, local, sub-national and regional actions; RD&D programmes; adopting common
policies; implementing development oriented actions; or expanding financing instruments. {4.5}
In several sectors, climate response options can be implemented to realise synergies and avoid conflicts with
other dimensions of sustainable development. Decisions about macroeconomic and other non-climate
policies can significantly affect emissions, adaptive capacity a

Publicado por: manin el 22 de Noviembre 2007 a las 11:55 AM

El resumen para políticos es eso, el nuevo fascismo. Las directrices propagandisticas para la intervención de los Estados en la vida de los ciudadanos.

"Página 68 del Informe Técnico del IPCC. En español. Al final del primer párrafo:

Sin embargo, no existe ninguna forma

establecida para calcular una función de distribución de

probabilidad única a partir de los resultados individuales

que tenga en cuenta las diferentes proposiciones de cada

estudio. La falta de restricciones fuertes que limiten las

altas sensibilidades climáticas evita la especificación de

un límite de 95 percentil

En cristiano (o llama a algún primo científico en el que confíes, que entienda de percentiles, y te lo explique):

No tenemos ni puta idea

http://valdeperrillos.com/node/1570

Publicado por: calentamientocero el 22 de Noviembre 2007 a las 12:34 PM

Pepe, ¿Por que es pluma de facha el mandarte a que te integres con la naturaleza y a vivir de lo que produzcan tus manos? ¿Tan terrible ves para tí lo que predicas para los demás?, anda vente para Senegal Pepe.

JHW ¿cuales son esos pájaros que no emigran?, porque en mi pueblo en cuanto se acaba la semencera que es su última oportunidad de encontrar comida todas las aves migratorias se largan, entre ellas las cigüeñas que creo que son los pájaros a los que te refieres. Claro en mi pueblo y su comarca no hay grandes vertederos en los que alimentarse durante el invierno.

Como curiosidad este año gracias al buen tiempo las labores se han terminado mucho antes que otros años y los pájaros se han largado antes ¿no es curioso que a más calor menos pájaros migratorios en invierno?.

Publicado por: framling el 22 de Noviembre 2007 a las 12:36 PM

Pepe, ¿Por que es pluma de facha el mandarte a que te integres con la naturaleza y a vivir de lo que produzcan tus manos? ¿Tan terrible ves para tí lo que predicas para los demás?, anda vente para Senegal Pepe.

¿Imponer tu punto de vista no te parece facha? ¿En que comentario mío he aconsejado, siquiera, que alguien se vaya al Senegal?

Publicado por: pepe el 22 de Noviembre 2007 a las 01:42 PM

Este artículo parece salido directamente de los "Protocolos de los sabios de Sión" :)

Publicado por: Anonymous el 22 de Noviembre 2007 a las 11:15 PM

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